• 8 December 2025
• Author Max Smedes

When you get off the bus in Tiraspol, Transnistria’s capital city, you can smell the gas crisis in the air. The sharp scent of coal stoves pricks in your nose as, for the first time in decades, smoke once again rises from the chimneys. For a long time, Transnistrians did everything with gas, from heating their homes to generating electricity. But since the supply of free Russian gas stopped, everything has changed in this breakaway region trapped between Moldova and Ukraine.

Freezing New Year’s Day
When the gas supply was cut off on New Year’s Day 2025, Transnistrians woke up not only to nasty hangovers, but also to freezing homes. Transnistria received no gas for the entire month of January. The effect was immense, especially since the de facto state had grown so dependent on Russian gas. “On January 1, everything stopped working”, says 27-year-old Mila from Tiraspol. “There was no heating, no hot water, and for long periods of the day also no electricity. And even cooking became impossible without gas”. In a dark and cold home, life gets “very uncomfortable very quickly”, Mila remembers.

To stay warm, many Transnistrians turned to wood and coal stoves, most of which hadn’t been used in decades. 54-year-old social worker Sasha did the same. He found an old wood stove in an abandoned house, previously inhabited by family members who had decided to leave Transnistria. Sasha recovered the stove, dragged it to his own house and managed to heat his home. “I was happy with the stove, but life at home remained depressing. Without light or hot water, it felt like a prison.” Sasha’s life had changed overnight. Previously he had enjoyed central heating in his modern apartment, but now he’s left with nothing but a stove as old as himself in his living room, and has to collect wood to stay warm.

The use of these old stoves has caused major problems in many Transnistrian households. The misuse of old heaters frequently led to house fires, especially in the first days of January. Makeshift chimneys made from old rain pipes created life-threatening situations, and, in the first weeks of 2025, several people died from carbon monoxide poisoning.

Endless Russian gas
Ever since Transnistria declared its independence from Moldova in 1990, the region has relied on support from Russia. The area between the Dniester river and the Ukrainian border has been outside Moldovan control since Transnistria, with the decisive support of Russian armed forces, won a war of independence against Moldova in 1992. Decades later Russian soldiers still patrol the streets, safeguarding the de facto independence of Transnistria, which is officially recognized by no other recognized state (only fellow de facto-states Abkhazia and South Ossetia recognize Transnistrian independence, Russia does not). Moldova still hopes to reintegrate the region.

Russia has had a strong influence in the area since Tsarist times. The region is historically loyal to Moscow and is viewed by the Kremlin as an important outpost on the border with Europe. For decades, Moscow supported Transnistria’s fragile economy with free gas. This allowed energy bills in Transnistria to remain low, and allowed heavy industry to flourish. At the same time, the government could earn money by exporting gas-generated electricity to Moldova.

Russian gas had been flowing through Ukrainian pipelines to Transnistria without any issue for a long time, but due to the Russian invasion of 2022, Kyiv decided not to renew its contract with Gazprom in 2024. As a result, Ukrainian pipelines closed for Russian gas transits. Although Russia could have continued deliveries via an alternative Turkish pipeline, it did not book any volumes on this route. Thus, Transnistrians were left out in the cold by their patron Russia. Many analysts saw this as a move to pressure Moldova’s current pro-European government, which depended on Transnistrian gas for its electricity. But while Moldova, with European support, could prepare for the end of Russian gas deliveries, the cessation hit Transnistria much harder.

Unprecedented price hikes
The pro-Russian government of Transnistria refused European aid and instead negotiated a Kremlin-brokered deal with a Hungarian gas supplier, paid through a Russian loan. In February gas deliveries to Transnistria were resumed, but this certainly did not solve the issues caused by the gas crisis. The Hungarian gas is far more expensive and is insufficient to fully restart industrial activities in Transnistria.

For consumers, gas bills rose by a staggering 109 percent, and electricity became roughly 60 percent more expensive. For industrial users, price increases were even more severe. This continues to create severe financial difficulties for many Transnistrian households. 28-year-old Daryna comes from what she describes as a relatively wealthy family in Tiraspol: “Even my parents now struggle to pay the bills”, she says. “Everything is more expensive, even basic things like bread”. Increased electricity prices are reflected in higher supermarket costs, and this only adds to the cost of living crisis Transnistrians have endured since the war in Ukraine began.

Nearly a year into the gas crisis, these financial worries have only increased further. “Prices in supermarkets have risen even more”, Sasha tells me over the phone. “My daughter from Moscow visited recently; some things are more expensive here than in the Russian capital! While incomes here are much lower.” Many fear a repeat of last January, Sasha adds. “It’s not cold yet, but we constantly talk about the coming winter. Everyone wonders: will the heating stay on, or will it switch off again?”.

Collapsing industry, departing Transnitrians
Meanwhile, the economy continues to struggle. Heavy industry, which thrived in Transnistria until last year, has never returned to pre-crisis production levels. Due to shortages and rising costs, many factories still operate at half capacity. Social worker Sasha saw how numerous employees were being sent home without pay. “There’s almost no support for all these people who lost their jobs. There’s no systemic solution at all”, he says. These effects on employment seem long-lasting. “I’m worried about the coming winter. If people can’t support their families, they’ll have to leave”, adds his colleague Andrei. It is a perfect storm for the wallets of many Transnistrians: costs are rising while incomes keep shrinking.

Many Transnistrians are leaving to work or study abroad, as they feel that the de facto state has little opportunities to offer them. In Tiraspol, billboards for employment agencies promising work in Europe or Russia are omnipresent. Labor migration from Transnistria has been very high for years, but the current situation seems to have accelerated it. 35-year-old construction worker Vyacheslav also feels the need to leave. “Now that everything is getting more expensive, I’m doing everything I can to leave”, he says. If all goes according to plan, he will move to Russia next month. “So many people are leaving. All my friends want to go too. At this rate, there might be no Transnistrians left ten years from now”, he says.
Moving towards Moldova?

The Transnistrian government itself is also facing massive financial problems. The Ministry of Economic Affairs expects tax revenue from industry and trade to decline further in the second half of 2025, while the state budget is already critically low. Since this summer, civil servants have been receiving their salaries in two instalments instead of through regular monthly payments.

Eleven months after the gas crisis began, the Transnistrian government is still in deep trouble, marked by high inflation, a departing workforce, and an immense funding gap in the budget. With winter fast approaching, it is unclear whether Tiraspol will be able to manage these problems now that Russian support has been significantly reduced.
As Russian support decreases, Moldovan influence in Transnistria grows. Since the war in Ukraine began, the border between Ukraine and Transnistria has been closed. The region now depends entirely on Moldova for its imports and exports. This reinforces an existing trend: even before 2022, Transnistrian trade with Moldova and the EU grew faster than trade with Russia and Ukraine.

Russian loyalty put to the test
As the gas crisis continues means the economy will be forced to de-industrialize, more Transnistrians might see more benefits in strengthening ties with Moldova. Above anything else, the interests of the company ‘Sheriff’ weigh heavily. Under the leadership of oligarch Viktor Gushan, Sheriff has taken control of a huge share of the Transnistrian economy, including nearly all supermarkets, gas stations, and local media. The company has significant influence on the policy of Tiraspol. As the economy keeps failing, the Moldovan market will become a more attractive alternative for Sheriff. Since the gas crisis, Sheriff’s business interests are increasingly diverging from Russia’s political goals. So far, Gushan’s ties to Moscow remain strong and he continues to toe the Kremlin line. But if his business interests in Transnistria decrease further, his loyalty could be tested.

Despite dwindling support, the official Transnistrian government line remains clearly pro-Russian. The gas crisis is consistently portrayed as an act of Moldovan and Ukrainian aggression, aimed at undermining the independence of Transnistria. In December 2024, days before the start of the crisis, President Vadim Krasnoselski was already pointing the finger of blame towards Moldova. He claimed the country was using the gas crisis to make “Transnistria implode.” A month later, he gave an extensive interview to RT (formerly Russia Today): “Moldova is trying to create a total energy catastrophe and seeks to blame Russia for it.” This fits his narrative: Moldova is the aggressor, Russia the protector. The gas crisis indeed offers Moldova an opportunity to regain influence over the breakaway region. But, the notion that Moldova, not Russia, is responsible for the gas crisis is simply untrue.

“Russia cares about me”
Yet this narrative still resonates with many Transnistrians. Even though Russia is literally and figuratively leaving the region in the cold, it continues to foster loyalty through various mechanisms: Russian language education is promoted, while learning Romanian (Moldova’s official language) is suppressed. Moscow has also been instrumentalizing Soviet nostalgia and promoting anti-Western media. Russia also offers direct support and special pensions, and Russian passports are handed out to many Transnistrians. And it’s working “I feel that Russia really cares about me”, Sasha says, despite all the hardships the gas crisis has caused him. “It’s just a feeling; I can’t touch it with my hands. Russia cares about me. I can’t prove it, but I feel it.”

Still, more Transnistrians are becoming critical of the relationship with Russia. Mila, for example, has changed her view since the gas crisis began. “My whole life, I was told Russia is our friend, that I should love Russia because they always helped us”, she says. “But the gas crisis changed that for me. Russia doesn’t care about us. We are just pawns in a game of Risk, nothing more”, she says emotionally. Mila decided to move, and left Tiraspol together with her boyfriend to resettle in the Moldovan capital Chișinău.

The coming winter will be a tense period for Transnistria. As energy demand rises, the reduced Russian support will, again, hit hard. As long as the political elite in Transnistria are unable, or refuse to reduce the region’s dependence on Russia, life along the Dniester will remain uncertain. Closer ties with Moldova could bring major economic improvements, but might also threaten the region’s fragile independence. It is an existential dilemma: remaining loyal to Russia will not change anything about the current hopeless economic situation, but moving closer to Moldova endangers the region’s independence. Caught in this geopolitical limbo, the future prospects of many Transnistrians fade ever further into the background.

The names of the Transnistrians quoted in this article have been pseudonymised to ensure their safety.

Max Smedes is a journalist with a focus on Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. He works from Amsterdam and Belgrade for broadcasters and print media.

This article was published earlier in Dutch on platformraam.nl