‘You Need a Crisis Before the World Starts Listening To You’

We at De Facto have been following Ramesh Ganohariti for a number of years, as he writes about de facto states not only from the perspective of recognition, but from within the context of sports and passport inequality as well. We interviewed him to discuss the changing world order, the wars in Nagorno-Karabakh and Palestine, and the future of de facto research.

Together with his co-author Gëzim Visoka, Ganohariti published the book Sub-State Recognition: The Politics of Recognition from Below (2025), in which they challenge centralized approaches to diplomacy and show that the dynamics of contested statehood can also be shaped from the bottom-up. He works at the Institute of Security and Global Affairs (Leiden University) in The Hague, the Netherlands.

You have been researching de facto states since you were a student. Where did your fascination start?
During my master’s in International Relations & Diplomacy, I stumbled upon the cases of Abkhazia and Transnistria, and their border issues interested me a lot. I grew up on an island, Sri Lanka, where there are no international borders, only water surrounding us. So, the fact that you can cross an international border on foot was such a revelation to me. On the other hand, we had a civil war in Sri Lanka, which created de facto borders between the north and the south, based on conflict lines. I think this strange in-betweenness of never having crossed a border on foot but also having these borders in my own country pushed me towards studying contested zones. Furthermore, I have always been fascinated by how people with multiple citizenships navigate bureaucracy. Given that people from contested zones often have multiple citizenships, this led me to explore this topic.

Your work focuses mainly on the former Soviet regions. Why?
My parents attended university in the Soviet Union, so even after they moved to Sri Lanka, I grew up in a “post-Soviet household”, and at home we spoke Russian for the most part. If you do research on a certain community, I believe that you have to speak at least one of the languages of that community. So it was a pragmatic choice. Language can make you a little bit of an insider.

When we started De Facto, we had to convince people of the importance of this topic, as these places were usually not in the headlines. Now, they are all over the news. What happened in the field of international relations?
The challenging of international norms has become easier. It’s coming from all sides: not only Russia but also the United States. States have become more emboldened to throw the international playbook out of the window, if it is in their best interest, just like international law and human rights. The actions of some states have shown other states that they can do what they want and that they can get away with it. And, even if actors in the international field say ‘no’, this will not mean much. Still, I don’t know how much the average person knows about Nagorno-Karabakh even after 120,000 people were forced to leave in 2023.

Your research on sub-state recognition started with Nagorno-Karabakh, right?
In 2020, when the crisis in this de facto state was at its height, we noticed on social media that some random places started putting out press statements saying that they were recognizing Nagorno-Karabakh as a state.

Random places?
Cities in California, France, Italy. That is interesting because normally, only states are involved in this recognition process. So we started researching and found out about these sub-state recognitions since 2008. This is the same year when Kosovo declared independence, and when Russia recognised Abkhazia and South Ossetia. We have identified 188 sub-state recognitions since then. It could be that we missed a few, because we only looked at the Latin-based languages and Russian. So maybe in Chinese and Arabic more cases have occurred that we are unaware of.

I read that the Catalan parliament recognized Kosovo.
Indeed, that is very interesting because Spain is still against it.

Why do these sub-state actors mingle in ‘state business’?
For a number of reasons. First of all, some of these de facto states have a strong diaspora. This is the case for Armenia, Somaliland, and Palestine, for example. Their diaspora lives in countries like the United Kingdom, the United States or France and puts pressure on their local governments to recognize their homeland as a state. Another reason, less related to the de facto state: local governments are sometimes in battle with the state government. This is the case for Catalonia and California: they do it out of self-interest. They want to challenge the central state and show they have some power as well. Some sub-state actors also do it for humanitarian reasons, or because they have cultural, religious, or historical ties.

What is the impact of these recognitions?
Mostly symbolic. That is our final conclusion, at least when it comes to impact on the contested territories. Despite 144 sub-state recognitions for Nagorno-Karabakh since 2020, it does not exist anymore. However, with Palestine, these recognitions had a quiet influence on national politics, for example, in the UK. There, members of the parliament in 2021 said: these sub-state entities have recognized Palestine, now it is our duty to also do so as well. But overall, the effects are small and didn’t end up in a change of position of these de facto states.

Why are your conclusions important for society?
It shows that states are no longer hundred percent in charge when it comes to recognition politics. It provides evidence that you can also look more from the bottom up, that local governments do engage in international relations. Another thing that shows is the immense power of the diaspora. How they interact together, how they keep connected to their homeland and how they engage in politics. And, a sad observation: in many of the cases, like Western Sahara, Palestine, Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, declarations of recognition all came after a spike in the level of conflict. You almost need to have a war or a conflict for recognition to happen and for the world to start listening to you. Palestine being the obvious example, now in terms of general states’ recognition as well.

Let’s go back to Nagorno-Karabakh. How was it for you as a researcher to watch the situation unfold? You were observing the rise of sub-state recognitions for Nagorno-Karabakh and at the same time you saw how the population was smashed in the face by reality.
Nagorno-Karabakh is the only case in the history of de facto states, thus far, where the whole population fled the territory, practically overnight. Diplomacy and diaspora were working intensely, however the international community did not manage to prevent Nagorno-Karabakh from being ethnically cleansed.

Could this be the future of other de facto states?
I hope not. A new war and a change of borders is always a possibility for a de facto state. That’s why places like South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Northern Cyprus and Transnistria find it very important to seek support of a patron state that will prevent this from happening. As a consequence, these de facto states are oftentimes pushed into the arms of this patron state, even if they do not want to. Sometimes it feels like a choice of the lesser of two evils.

In the last decades, there hasn’t been much change in the status of most de facto states. But after what happened to Nagorno-Karabakh, are the people in, for example, Abkhazia and South Ossetia less secure about their existence?
I don’t think it is as existential, in terms of their everyday lives. They have the support of Russia. However, they do acknowledge that their brothers in Karabakh have been faced with a lack of help. Even with a powerful patron, an armed conflict can occur. Obviously, radical, nationalist voices in Georgia said: ‘We should do the same as Azerbaijan, reclaim our territory.’ But the more moderate voices acknowledge that it is really hard militarily to take over South Ossetia or Abkhazia now.

In Nagorno-Karabakh, the people also thought that the Russians would always be on their side. Do you think the fall of this de facto state changed the geopolitical field?
I think it showed that when a state is contested, and if the parent state succeeds in its claim, very little international opposition is going to come at the end of the day. Of course, they say something about the humanitarian situation, but not about the takeover per se. In the international legal system, Karabakh does belong to Azerbaijan.

Let’s go to another way of recognition: sports. You wrote about football and the way it plays a role in self-determination.
I was curious about contested states engaging in international sports. I saw these ‘strange’ places like Northern Cyprus, Tamil Elam and Tibet, taking part in football competitions. I researched CONIFA, the Confederation of Independent Football Associations. Why do communities participate in this competition? Because it is impossible to join FIFA, it’s the next best thing in the absence of FIFA membership. They engage with other contested territories, which is important not only for the game, but also to share their stories, to give a voice to their communities. It is really about using all available platforms to engage internationally. In Abkhazia, people were thrilled by the fact that they hosted the CONIFA World Football Cup in 2016, the stands were full, and there was a lot of international attention.

People from Kosovo were exhilarated when their country was allowed to join FIFA and the Olympics.
When they were accepted into the international sports arena, it meant the world to them. Sports is bottom-up, everyone plays sports, they see it everyday on TV. Anecdotally, I heard they were more excited that they could join international sporting competitions than being recognised by other states. Up to then, Kosovars could only participate if they had dual citizenship.

That brings us to passport inequality, another topic you wrote about quite extensively.
Domestically, the documents of de facto states work well, most of these places have a functioning government structure. But internationally, inhabitants from these areas encounter trouble immediately. Ethically, everyone should have the right to travel freely. But these people are stuck, whereas someone from the European Union just buys a ticket and flies out tomorrow. This passport inequality is so extreme. To solve the limits of this inequality, many inhabitants of de facto states try to get a second citizenship or passport. However, if you want to study abroad, your diploma is most probably not recognized, nor is your birth certificate or other official documents. People from contested states just end up being on the extreme side of this inequality.

Your new research focuses on this inequality within the EU. Why is that so interesting?
We have a Schengen region, which means a common border. Still, there is tension because the respective states deal differently with documents of contested states. For example, following the widespread recognition of Kosovo from 2008, their passports were not recognised uniformly across the EU. Spain was the last country to recognise Kosovo passports in January 2024. Similarly, Turkish passports issued to certain residents of Northern Cyprus are not recognised by Greece. These tensions occur, and people get stuck.

Sounds like a lot of desk research.
Unfortunately, because of the current war in Ukraine, my field sites are all closed. It is very difficult to get into Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and to a lesser extent into Transnistria. It is about safety, not only of me as a researcher but also of the participants. I do not want them to get into trouble because they were speaking to an outsider. It also became much harder to communicate from afar. Everything has become so polarized. People are increasingly self-policing and you have to accept that some doors will be closed.

That must be frustrating.
It is definitely frustrating that I cannot go back. But this is coming from a world of privilege, this is not the biggest problem in the grand scheme of things. I cannot go there, so what? Too bad. I can switch to the institutional approach, focusing on passport inequality within the EU.

What is your perspective on the future of de facto research?
It is increasingly getting bigger. Obviously, we all have our subfields within this topic and most of us know each other. It would be great if de facto state scholars would interact with other fields. Unrecognized states might seem a niche topic, but there are many relevant issues that also happen in recognized states. We can learn a lot from other research, for example on statelessness, citizenship, migration or legal issues. It would be good to discuss and talk.

Sub-State Recognition: The Politics of Recognition from Below (2025) by Gëzim Visoka and Ramesh Ganohariti is published by Palgrave Macmillan Cham.

The next interview in this new series will be with scientists Gaëlle Le Pavic and Said Gezerdava. Their cooperation questions who can speak about de facto states, and who remains silent. If you want to stay tuned, also about other news & events, follow us on the socials @defactoborders or subscribe to our newsletter.